In this paper, I quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by rms aect policy enactment. To achieve this end, I construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. I then develop and estimate a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to aect the probability that a policy is enacted. I nd that the eect of lobbying expenditures on a policy's equilibrium enactment probability to be statistically signicant but very small. Nonetheless, the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130 percent.
Introduction
Government policies often benet certain rms at the expense of others. Environmental regulations, for example, may give a competitive advantage to rms with cleaner production technologies. As a result, many rms actively engage in lobbying activities in hopes of inuencing the policy-making process. The issue of political inuence by private interests is therefore of great concern to any democratic society, since most policies aect not only rms' protability but also the general public. This gives rise to the central question addressed in this paper: To what extent does lobbying inuence public policy?
In this paper, I study lobbying activities by rms that have heterogeneous and often competing interests in public policies. The main goal of the paper is to quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures aect the probability that a policy, as introduced in legislation, is ultimately enacted into law by the United States Congress. To achieve this goal, I construct a novel dataset that contains detailed information on policy enactment and lobbying activities during the 110th Congress (20072008) . Information on lobbying activities is obtained from the lobbying reports mandated by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. I then specify and estimate a game-theoretic model of lobbying where interest groups choose lobbying expenditures with the goal of inuencing the probability that certain policies are enacted. To focus the analysis, I restrict attention to energy policies. While the empirical results of this study may be specic to energy policies, the empirical framework in this paper is general, and can be readily applied to any type of policies.
In the estimation, I nd that the average dierence between the initial and nal enactment probability of a policy is small: only 0.05 percentage points. This nding is the result of two eects. First, the eect of lobbying expenditures on the policy enactment probability is very small. For example, based on the estimation, it would cost $3 million or more for one lobbying group to change a policy's enactment probability by 1.2 percentage points if no other groups also lobby. Second, the eects of expenditures by both supporting and opposing lobbies partially cancel each other out. I nd that 20 percent of the direct eects of lobbying are canceled out by competing lobbies. However, although the eect of lobbying expenditures on the policy enactment probability is very small even without the canceling-out eect, the average returns to lobbying expenditures are estimated to be 137152 percent. Because the average value of a policy to a particular group is estimated to be over $500 million, even a small change in its enactment probability can lead to large private returns.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper that structurally estimates a rentseeking model of lobbying. A structural approach is essential for three main reasons. First, explicitly modeling interest groups' decisions may help overcome the empirical challenges to studying lobbying. As discussed in de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) , the main statistical challenges include omitted-variable bias and endogenous selection bias. Although instrumental variables can be used to address these challenges, as in de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) , it is very dicult to obtain the instrumental variables and justify their exogeneity. Second, in the data, policy-specic lobbying expenditures are not observed, while total lobbying expenditures across policies are observed for each lobbying group. Instead of arbitrarily dividing the total lobbying expenditure into policy-specic expenditures, I use the equilibrium condition derived from the model that the marginal benet of lobbying is equal to the marginal cost at equilibrium. Third, the structural approach enables me to calculate private returns from lobbying expenditures. The private returns to an interest group are dened as the dierence in the expected payos with and without lobbying expenditures. To calculate the expected payo when an interest group chooses not to lobby, I consider the strategic reaction of other interest groups characterized by the model, as well as the initial probability that the targeted policy is enacted into law. This point has been ignored in previous studies.
1
This paper provides a new method of dening and measuring the outcome of lobbying. A key feature in this method is that policies, not entire bills, are the unit of analysis. I dene a policy as a part of a bill that addresses one unique issue. Most existing studies regarding 1 For example, de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) estimate the elasticities of the amount of academic earmarks to universities with respect to lobbying expenditures, implicitly assuming that if a university does not lobby, it will receive no earmarks. Having this assumption may result in overestimating the returns from lobbying. They also assume that there is no competition between universities for earmarks, which may further bias the results. the inuence of interest groups on legislation have focused on bills as the fundamental unit of analysis.
2 However, a bill usually contains multiple policies, which may or may not be related to each other; and the same policy may appear in multiple bills. Consider a bill (H.R. 6566) from the 110th Congress that was intended to promote domestic energy production. This bill contained several dierent policies, such as one allowing natural gas production on the outer Continental Shelf and one extending the solar energy property tax credit. The bill was not enacted, but the solar energy tax provision was later inserted into the nancial industry bailout bill (H.R. 1424), which was enacted. If a researcher were to focus only on the fate of the energy bill, she would potentially mismeasure the eect of lobbying by ignoring the fact that the solar energy tax policy was ultimately enacted as a part of the nancial industry bill.
Even more importantly, in practice, energy rms care about the enactment of the tax policy, not about which bill it was included in. This paper provides a systematic method of tracking each policy's movement through bills when studying large sets of policies.
Lastly, this paper expands the scope of the analysis to all energy policies that were ever introduced as a part of non-appropriations legislation during the period of the study. This is in contrast to most existing empirical studies, which only focus on legislative voting behavior regarding certain subsets of bills considered salient.
3 However, most bills die in committee before they reach the House or Senate oor for a vote. Moreover, interest groups may aect the contents of a bill that is brought to a vote, not just the result of the vote itself. This paper includes policies that are not even seriously considered in committees, which enhances the generality of the results. In that regard, this paper is similar to Hall and Wayman (1990) , Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech (2009) , and Igan and Mishra (2014) .
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the main features and construction of the dataset. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the identication and estimation strategy. Section 5 contains the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Background and Data
I construct a dataset on energy policies considered in the 110th Congress and the lobbying activities targeting these policies by energy rms and trade associations. The main dataset is based on lobbying reports mandated by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which are 2 Some exceptions include studies whose unit of analysis is industries. These study the inuence of industry interests on the level of trade protection, pioneered by the theoretical work of Grossman and Helpman (1994) .
See, for example, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) , and Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2012) . Another notable exception is Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech (2009) , in which the authors study 98 randomly selected policy issues in which interest groups are involved, and then follow those issues for four years (19992002) . The main dierence is that they rely on interviews with lobbyists to obtain policy issues, while I look directly at the text of the bills.
3 This literature seeks to estimate the eect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of individual legislators. See Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) for a survey of this strand of the literature.
available at the Senate Oce of Public Records, and on legislative information available in the Library of Congress. I describe the main features of the construction of the dataset and show summary statistics of the key variables.
Bills vs. Policies
Existing studies have focused on legislative bills as the fundamental unit of analysis. However, a bill often addresses multiple heterogeneous issues, and some parts of a bill can be dropped from the bill or inserted into another bill over the course of the legislative process. Given these two facts, there can be a few problems when applying the bill approach to studying the eects of lobbying. First, the unit of analysis may be dierent from the units actually being targeted by interest groups. When an interest group lobbies on a bill, its targets are specic policy issues, which may be addressed in a certain part of the bill, not necessarily in its entirety. Second, the outcome of the lobbying eorts can be misrepresented because it is possible for the fate of an entire bill to be dierent than that of each bill section. Third, it is not always easy to clearly assess how successful lobbying eorts are when an interest group supports some bill sections while opposing others. These problems can be mitigated if the research is focused on one specic policy issue, but in order to generalize research ndings, studying a large number of policy issues is key. In this paper, I therefore propose a method to systematically determine the unit of analysis and its nal legislative status in practice.
A natural place to start is with the sections of a bill, as dened in the bill text. A section of a bill often represents a policy proposal regarding a unique issue. To obtain the enactment information, I track each section across bills by adhering to the following procedures. 6 Second, based on the measured distances among the vectors, I create a graph of the bill sections. Third, I group the sections using an algorithm to nd connected components in the graph. Using the unique bill sections as the unit of analysis helps resolve the aforementioned problems.
However, this approach presents a potential problem: for any given policy issue, there can be multiple policy proposals. Using the method proposed in this paper, I obtain a list of the unique policy proposals regarding an issue and the nal legislative status of each unique proposal. Of these policy proposals and the existing status quo policy, only one is eventually chosen during the legislative process. Therefore, the eect of lobbying on one policy proposal may not be independent from that on another policy proposal. This can cause a problem in assessing the eect of lobbying. For example, consider a specic policy issue: whether or not, and to what extent, to extend a status quo tax credit policy for certain investments.
Policy proposal A extends the tax credit by one year, and proposal B extends it by three years. Suppose proposal A is enacted. If proposals A and B are considered separately, the supportive lobbying eorts for A are recorded as successful and those for B as unsuccessful.
However, it is possible that the lobbying eorts for B may have aected the probability that proposal A is enacted. To resolve this issue, I adjust the denition of the unit of analysis by combining the unique bill sections into one group if they address the same policy issue and 5 A more detailed description of these procedures can be found in Appendix A.1. and A.2. 6 Vector space models are used in information ltering, information retrieval, indexing, and relevancy rankings. For references, see Salton, Wong, and Yang (1975) and Raghavan and Wong (1986) . aect the interest groups in the same direction, either positively or negatively.
7 I call each group of bill sections a policy, and set it as the unit of analysis in this paper. In the dataset, a policy appears in 3 dierent bills on average.
The dataset covers all policies that were both considered in the 110th Congress (20072008) and that create, modify, or repeal a federal nancial intervention or regulation whose main statutory subjects are coal, oil, nuclear or renewable energy companies, or electric and gas utilities. Examples are tax incentives for renewable energy sources, loan guarantees to construct energy-ecient power lines, and regulation of mercury emissions from coal-red power plants. Note that not all policies that aect the energy sector are included in the analysis because their statutory subjects might be from a dierent sector. For example, a policy to enhance competition in the railroad industry aects the coal mining industry and the electric utilities that mainly use coal to generate electricity, but it is not in the sample because the statutory subjects are the rms in the railroad industry. In the dataset, there are 538 policies which are included in 445 bills. 8
A policy is considered to have been enacted if the policy is included in the nal version of an enacted bill. By this denition, 45 policies (8.4 percent) were enacted into law. 9 Table  1 shows the nal the status of the policies. Over 70 percent of the policies died even before being sent to the oor of the House or the Senate (denoted as Not Reported in the table), and about 20 percent of the policies reached the oor, but were not enacted into law (denoted as Reported, Not Enacted in the table).
Lobbying Disclosure Data
Lobbyists can be categorized into two groups by their professional arrangements: in-house (or internal) lobbyists and external lobbyists.
10 In-house lobbyists are hired by a rm, a trade association, or a citizens' group as employees. External lobbyists have a contract with a client and often work for multiple clients simultaneously. Most lobbyists, whether in-house or external, are required to register and le a report to disclose their lobbying activities by 7 I adopt a set of rules to combine the unique bill sections into one group. These rules are described in Appendix A.2.
8 In Appendix A.1, I describe how these 538 policies were selected to be in the analysis.
9 Note that the average enactment rate of all bills and joint resolutions in the 110th Congress is 4.1 percent.
The enactment rate of a policy in the dataset is higher than that of a bill because on average, an enacted bill includes more policies than a rejected bill. Out of 445 bills that included the policies in the dataset, only 5 bills (1.1 percent) were enacted.
10 According to Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2015) , about 40 percent of registered lobbyists are inhouse lobbyists. The energy sub-sectors are often politically organized. Among the top 55 lobbying spenders, there are 8 trade associations that represent energy sub-sectors. 13 For example, the American Petroleum Institute represents the U.S. oil and natural gas industry and has members including major oil and natural gas companies such as Exxon Mobil, BP, and Chevron. All energy companies among the top lobbying spenders are members of at least one trade association. I categorize energy rms and trade associations in the dataset into 4 groups: (i) the coal mining industry and investor-owned electric utilities that mainly use coal for power generation;
(ii) the oil and natural gas industry; (iii) the nuclear industry and investor-owned electric utilities that mainly use nuclear energy for power generation; and (iv) the renewable energy industry (such as bio, solar, wind, geothermal, and hydro-kinetic energy) and investor-owned electric utilities that mainly use renewable energy for power generation.
I designate certain rms and trade associations as strategic or major in lobbying the legislature on the energy policies in the dataset.
14 I assume that these strategic rms and 11 The cuto amount is $5,000 for external lobbyists and $20,000 for self-lobbying entities. The frequency of lings was originally semi-annual, and after the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 was enacted, it became quarterly. This amendment also strengthened the registration criteria and the enforcement rules.
12 See Appendix A.3 for a detailed description on how I identied these 559 entities from the lobbying disclosure reports.
13 This is the list of trade associations which are among the top 55 lobbying spenders in the energy sector: (1) the National Mining Association (coal mining industry); (2) the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity (coal industry and electric utilities that mainly use coal to generate electricity); (3) the American Petroleum Institute (oil and natural gas industry); (4) the Nuclear Energy Institute (nuclear industry and electric utilities that mainly use nuclear energy to generate electricity); (5) the Edison Electric Institute (investor-owned electric utilities); (6) the American Wind Energy Association (wind energy industry); (7) the Solar Energy Industries Association (solar energy industry); and (8) the National Biodiesel Board (biodiesel industry).
14 In this paper, environmental groups are not considered as strategic or major in energy policy lobbying. 
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The total amount of lobbying expenditures by these strategic entities accounts for 66 percent of that of the energy sector as a whole. This is because their lobbying spending is very small compared to that by the energy sector. During the period of this study, environmental groups spent $35.2 million dollars in total, which accounts for only 6 percent of the total lobbying expenditures by the energy sector. Moreover, much of the lobbying of these groups is focused on issues outside the energy sector.
15 There are two reasons why only large and active rms and trade associations are included in the analysis.
First, small rms and large rms may take dierent positions on a policy even though they belong to the same industry. They are often treated dierently in public policies. The goal is to have a coalition consisting of homogenous interests. Second, small rms are more likely to lobby private policies such as an earmark for a specic product.
16 The renewable energy group is relatively more heterogeneous than other groups. I use a lower threshold so that all all large rms and trade associations in the renewable energy industry that tend to lobby public policies. Alternatively, I could have constructed three separate lobbying coalitions (solar, wind, and bio-based energy), but some rms in this coalition are involved in various renewable energy sources, which makes it dicult to determine which coalition these rms should belong to.
17 See Table 17 in the Appendix for a list of the 42 entities in the dataset.
18 These gures are based on the Compustat dataset and do not include information on rms that were not on the U.S. stock market at the end of 2007.
Lobbying Participation and Position
For each rm or trade association in each lobbying coalition, I extract from lobbying reports and other auxiliary sources two pieces of information for each policy: (i) whether or not the entity lobbied the legislature on the policy and (ii) whether the entity supports or opposes it.
I assume that when a bill is listed as a lobbying target in the report, all energy policies in the 20 Table 3 shows some patterns of participation by each lobbying coalition. Lobbying participation is selective in the sense that not all policies are lobbied by all coalitions. The second column of the table shows the average frequency of lobbying participation on a policy. The oil and natural gas coalition participates the most frequently, followed by the renewable energy coalition. The renewable energy coalition participates relatively often compared to its total lobbying expenditures, which is less than one-tenth of that of the oil and natural gas coalition.
The other columns show the correlation of lobbying participation among lobbying coalitions.
It can be seen that lobbying participation is positively correlated. To quantify the eect of lobbying participation on the probability that a policy is enacted, it is necessary to control for the selection in lobbying participation. This is complicated by the fact that both the outcome variable (the enactment of a policy) and the endogenous explanatory variable (the participation in lobbying on the policy) are discrete. In this paper, I
Policy Passage and Lobbying
quantify the eect of lobbying expenditures on the enactment probability of a policy, controlling the endogeneity of lobbying decisions and exploiting the structure of the model described in the next section.
Observed Characteristics of Policies
In the data, policies dier in several observed dimensions. First, the general public has dierent opinions on each policy. I measure public opinion on a policy by using polling data Third, each policy heterogeneously aects each of the lobbying coalitions in two observed aspects. For each coalition, one aspect is whether the policy favors or disadvantages the coalition (pro-coal, pro-oil/gas, pro-nuclear, and pro-renewable). The other aspect is whether or not the policy directly aects that coalition (relevant-coal, relevant-oil/gas, relevant-nuclear, and relevant-renewable). For instance, a tax credit policy for capturing and sequestrating carbon dioxide from coal-red power plants directly benets the coal industry while it indirectly aects other energy industries. Lobbying can be a long-term investment that plays out over several years or longer. Even if policy advocates may not achieve an immediate policy response, they may have managed to get some of their ideas into the policy community. Furthermore, it should be noted that regardless of whether or not a policy is enacted during a certain Congress, the following Congresses may revisit that policy with new but related policies. An enacted tax credit may be adjusted in the next Congress, for example.
To gauge the extent of the long-term eect of lobbying on policy outcomes, I track the policies in my dataset for four more years, i.e., through the terms of the 111th and the 112th
Congresses. To track these policies, I use the same method described in Section 2.1. The results of this additional four years of tracking are represented in Table 6 , on which I base the following discussion of three interesting trends.
First, 65.5 percent of the policies that failed to be enacted in the 110th Congress were not re-introduced in bills during the following four years. To complement the policy approach 21 There are 1,331 national polls on energy and environmental issues available at the Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research during the period in question. Among them, I nd that 158 polls are directly relevant to the energy policy issues in the data. The subjects of these polls include miner safety standards, renewable portfolio standards, windfall prot taxes on oil and gas companies, etc. The average sample size is 1,294, and the sample sizes range from 817 to 18,018. These 158 polls are matched to 293 policies in the data. 
Model
There is a nite set of lobbying coalitions, denoted as L. Each lobbying coalition represents a unique interest. These lobbying coalitions are the players in the lobbying game. Consider a specic policy. In the absence of lobbying, the policy will be enacted into law with probability π. Each player values the policy heterogeneously, and the value of the policy to player is denoted as v . Some players have positive values and others have negative values from the enactment of the policy. I denote the set of players who positively value the policy as L f ⊆ L and those who negatively value it as L a ⊆ L. For simplicity, it is assumed that the legislative process regarding a policy does not interfere with that of any other policy.
The model is a game of complete information, consisting of two stages.
administrative or informational cost to embark on lobbying activities. Examples of such costs could include the costs of initial research and surveys on the economic, social, or environmental eects of the proposed policy as well as related existing policies. These costs may vary by both policy and player. The initial level of support for the policy in the legislature, the value of the policy to all players, and the entry costs of lobbying on the policy for all players are common knowledge. Second, knowing the identities of other participants, players simultaneously decide how much to spend in order to aect the chances that the policy will be enacted. The initial level of support for the policy in the legislature and the lobbying expenditures of each player determine the probability that the policy is enacted. This second-stage game is modeled as an all-pay group contest in the sense that the lobbying expenditures are sunk costs and the rent is a public good shared amongst all groups on the same side of a policy.
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The earliest papers on rent-seeking behaviors, such as Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) , have been extended in various directions, and rent-seeking literature has studied lobbying as an application.
28 One extension that is very relevant to this paper is that rent is a groupspecic public good.
29 An important modeling issue is to determine a policy enactment production function, denoted as p(s f , s a ; π). This function denes how the probability that a policy is enacted, p, is determined by the initial enactment probability, denoted as π; and by a prole of supporting players' spending, s f ≡ (s i ) i∈L f , and opposing players' spending, s a ≡ (s j ) j∈La . I assume the following production function:
where β f > 0, β a > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1). There are a few notable features in this specication. First, p(0, 0; π) = π, which is consistent with the denition of π. Second, this specication allows a prior advantage or disadvantage to each group such that when only the supporting (opposing) group lobbies, the probability that a policy is enacted is not necessarily one (zero). This is consistent with the data, but in the literature on contests, it is often assumed that when only one player participates, his winning probability is one.
30 Third, by assuming that γ < 1, the number of lobbying participants matters in determining the probability that the policy 27 By taking a rent-seeking contest approach, the mechanism through which lobbying activities aect the policy choices of the legislature is not specically modeled. There are two types of economic models of interest group inuence, and it is not easy to pick one model over another based on the data on lobbying. Papers in the the rst category assume that interest groups oer legislators money or resources in exchange for legislative favors (e.g., Snyder 1991, and Groseclose and Snyder 1996) . Although by law lobbying expenditures may not directly benet legislators, lobbyists often act as bundlers of campaign contributions, and they may provide other politically valuable resources. Papers in the second category assume that interest groups may aect policy outcomes by providing relevant information to the lawmaker (e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright 1996, and Bennedsen and Feldmann 2002) . As discussed in Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2015) , lobbyists may have technical expertise on specic policy issues, and/or they may act as a credible or trusted transmitter, from the view of legislators, of valuable information possessed by the rms or organizations that hire them.
28 For a survey on the rent-seeking literature, see Nitzan (1994) , Konrad (2007) , or Corchon (2007) . As for the applications of the literature to lobbying, see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) , Che and Gale (1998), and Cotton (2009) , for example.
29 See, for example, Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg (1990) , Nitzan (1991) , Riaz, Shogren, and Johnson (1995) , Dijkstra (1998), and Baik (2008) .
30 For example, Tullock's standard contest success function is that the winning probability of player i given
where γ > 0, if at least one player spends non-zero amount of money, and otherwise, is 1/n. Note that if si > 0 and sj = 0 for all j = i, then pi = 1. becomes law: If the same amount of money is spent on one side, the more participants there are, the more eective the money is.
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Given the policy enactment production function specied above, the expected payo of a player is delineated as follows. Players are assumed to be risk-neutral and without budget constraints.
32 If player spends s to lobby for a policy given other players' spending (s − ,f , s a ), then the expected payo is p(s f , s a ; π)v − s − c , where c is the entry cost. Note that if the player lobbies against the policy, the expected payo can be similarly dened. If the player does not participate, the expected payo is p(s − ,f , s a ; π)v .
The equilibrium concept in this game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the second stage of the game, and the proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 In the second stage of the game, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
Since a unique equilibrium in pure strategies exists in the second stage, a payo matrix in the rst stage can be uniquely determined. As a result, the rst stage game boils down to a nite normal-form game. It is well known that every nite normal-form game has a mixedstrategy equilibrium. Therefore, in the rst stage, a (mixed-strategy) equilibrium exists but may not be unique.
We do not observe the initial enactment probability, the values, and the entry costs. For each policy k, I make the following parametric assumptions. First, I assume that the initial enactment probability, π k , depends on the sum of a linear index of Z k and an unobserved random variable ξ k :
where F (·) is a cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Z k is a vector of a constant, the variables regarding public opinion (salience, public opinion), and the content (more regulation, less regulation, more government spending). ξ k includes the omitted variables regarding other activities of political inuence that are not considered in this model. 33 I assume that ξ k is distributed with N (0, σ ξ ). Second, I assume that the log of the valuation of policy k to player , log |V ,k |, is additively separable into a linear index of X ,k and an unobserved random variable η ,k :
where η follows N (0, σ η ). X ,k is the vector of a constant and the direct relevance of the policy to the coalition (relevance ). Lastly, I assume that ξ k and (η ,k ) ∈L are mutually independent.
31 This assumption is data-driven. In the data, there are multiple lobbying participants from the same side.
However, when the lobbying expenditures by two dierent players are perfect substitutes (γ = 1) and budget constraints do not exist, there is only one participant from each side.
32 Baik (2008) studies a rent-seeking contest with group-specic public goods when players are budgetconstrained. He nds that the free-rider problem within a group is alleviated compared to the base model without budget constraints.
33 In particular, I focus on the lobbying behaviors of strategic or major energy rms, which I dene in Section 2. However, other nonstrategic rms, trade associations, and citizens' groups also attempt to inuence legislators. I assume that their activities of political inuence happen before the lobbying coalitions in the dataset make lobbying decisions. The following four equations succinctly represent how the observed variables in the data are related to the objects in the model. To simplify the argument, let us focus on the case where there are two interest groups on the supporting side of a specic policy. For cases with more than two interest groups and dierent sides, the argument here can still be easily applied.
The rst equation is on the policy enactment probability. Whether or not policy k is enacted is represented by an indicator variable, Y k , which takes 1 when the policy is enacted and 0 otherwise. The enactment probability is p(s 1,k , s 2,k , π k ) given the lobbying expenditures of interest groups 1 and 2 (s 1,k , s 2,k ) and the initial enactment probability (π k ). Therefore,
The second equation is the participation rule of an interest group. Whether or not interest group decides to lobby for policy k is represented by an indicator variable, D ,k , which takes 1 when the group participates in lobbying for the policy and 0 otherwise. The participation rule involves comparing the benet of lobbying, which is the dierence in the enactment probabilities multiplied by the value of the policy, with the cost of lobbying, which is the sum of the eective spending (s ,k ) and the entry cost (c ,k ). This is expressed as for = 1, 2, 
Suppose both groups lobby (i.e., d 1,k = 1 and d 2,k = 1). Then ϕ 1 (·) and ϕ 2 (·) satisfy the rst order conditions:
Although a closed-form expression for ϕ (·) does not exist, the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B guides the computation. If one group does not lobby, say group 1, then ϕ 1 (·) is zero. Now, given the equilibrium condition that the lobbying expenditures are optimal, we have the following equation for = 1, 2:
Lastly, we observe the total lobbying expenditures for each interest group.
34 Let s ≡ 34 Specically, s is the sum of lobbying expenditures by player on all energy policies. In the data, I observe the sum of lobbying expenditures on all policies for each player. Therefore, it is crucial to determine the energy lobbying expenditures from the total lobbying expenditures for each player. In doing so, I use information on lobbying participation at the bill level, which I describe in detail in Appendix D.6. Furthermore, based on the sensitivity analyses in Appendix D.6, I nd that the key results are robust to variation in the breakdown of the total lobbying expenditures. 
where n is the total number of policies in the data.
Identifying Assumptions
The main empirical challenge in identifying the structural parameters of the model from the data is twofold. First, the initial enactment probability, π k , is not observed and is correlated with the lobbying decisions of interest groups, as shown in equations (4.2) and (4.3).
This problem is well-acknowledged in the literature of political inuence. Second, policyspecic lobbying expenditures are not observed, although the total lobbying expenditures are observed.
To address these challenges, the structure of the model and the functional form assumptions play a crucial role. All assumptions used in this analysis are listed as follows.
Assumption 1 We have a random sample of (
k=1 for large n, and observe (s 1 , ..., s L ). w k is a vector of the attributes of policy k.
This assumption is made in most cross-sectional analyses. Relaxing this assumption requires that some specic conditions on the relationship among dierent policies are satised.
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Assumption 2 The enactment production function, p(·), and the joint distribution of the unobservable variables in the model, (π k , v 1,k , ..., v L,k ), conditional on policy attributes w k , are known up to nite-dimensional parameters.
The parametric assumptions in the main estimation are presented in equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3). Nonparametric identication of the enactment production function and the distribution of the unobserved variables is impossible because the observed output variable related to the enactment production function, Y k , is binary and we do not observe the policyspecic expenditures. Note that the production function is inevitably nonlinear because its range is bounded, i.e., [0, 1] , while its domain is not. When presenting the key ndings, I discuss how certain features of the policy enactment production function may aect the results.
These parametric assumptions also play an important role in addressing the endogeneity issue that the initial enactment probability, π k , is correlated with the lobbying activities. Note that instrumental variables, which aect the lobbying decisions but do not aect the initial enactment probability, are very dicult to obtain. Instead, I exploit the model prediction on the lobbying decisions. These lobbying decisions are tightly tied to the enactment production function, as demonstrated in equations (4.2) and (4.3). Therefore, the only structure that I impose on the data, in addition to the parametrization of the enactment production function and the joint distribution of the unobservable variables, is that the lobbying decisions are an 35 For example, in assessing the impact of chain retail stores on the other retailers and local community, Jia (2008) exploits the supermodularity of the entry games in multiple locations/markets by two chain stores. equilibrium outcome where the expected marginal returns to lobbying to interest groups are equal to one for each policy. One issue, however, is that there can be multiple equilibria in the rst stage of the game when the interest groups decide whether to participate in lobbying.
To obtain a unique prediction for lobbying participation, I impose an equilibrium selection rule.
36 When estimating the model, I select the equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the payos of all players.
Assumption 3 When there exist multiple Nash equilibria, the equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the payos of all players is chosen.
Note that we have three pieces of information in the data (enactment, lobbying participation, and total lobbying expenditures), while we have four key components in the model (lobbying eectiveness, mean and variance of policy value, and entry cost). In resolving this problem, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 4 The entry costs to interest groups are observed by the econometrician.
In the estimation, I x the value of the entry cost to be the same across policies and interest groups, and set it to be the smallest lobbying expenditure undertaken by entities that lobbied for one policy in the data. 
Estimation
I have the individual policy-level data (enactment and lobbying participation proles) and the aggregate player-level data (total lobbying expenditures). Both levels of data are needed to identify the parameters in the model as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, I use an estimator that combines the likelihood of observing the individual policy-level data and the moment condition related to the aggregate player-level data.
Let the vector of the parameters of the model be denoted by θ. I propose and use a penalized likelihood estimator where the scalar objective function Q n (θ) is dened as: However, it is not practical to employ their method given the size of my dataset.
37 Had policy-specic lobbying expenditures been observed, the entry cost could have been identied from the minimum of the policy-specic lobbying expenditures.
for any given λ > 0, whereφ (w k ; θ) is the expected lobbying expenditures by interest group for policy k with attributes w k for any = 1, ..., L:
where d * k (v k , π k ) denotes the equilibrium lobbying participation prole given (v k , π k ). 38 By Assumption 3, there is a unique d * k for any given (v k , π k ).
The rst part of the objective function is the average of the log-likelihood of observing 
, do not have a closedform solution. Therefore, I simulate in obtaining the value for Q n (θ) for any θ. These two parts of the objective function are weighted by λ.
Letθ n ∈ arg max θ∈Θ Q n (θ) where Q n (θ) is as dened in (4.5). Under some regularity conditions, this proposed estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.
Intuitively, the estimator is consistent because as n → ∞, the second part of the objective function converges to 0 and the rst part is maximized at the true parameter. The choice of λ determines the eciency of this estimator, but the consistency of the estimator holds for any positive value of λ. For more discussion on this estimator, see Appendix C.
5 Empirical Results Table 7 shows the parameter estimates. The asymptotic standard errors are provided in parentheses.
39

Model Fit
Using the estimated parameters, I simulate the data and calculate some key moments displayed in Table 8 . The overall t of the simulated data to the actual data is good in both the level and the trend. The table shows the actual and predicted moments regarding policy enactment, lobbying participation, and total lobbying expenditures.
In addition to the rst order moments of the marginal distributions of policy enactment and lobbying participation, some rst order moments of their joint distribution are also reported in the table. One set of such moments are the lobbying participation patterns of all four players by their lobbying positions. The other set of moments are the average enactment rate conditional on these lobbying participation patterns. Note that the enactment rate for the policies that were not lobbied is over-predicted (5.39 percent as opposed to zero), as is the frequency of lobbying by the supporters only (53.13 percent as opposed to 41.82 percent).
This is related to the specication of the enactment production function in equation (3.1),
where the marginal eect of supportive lobbying on the nal enactment probability decreases as the initial enactment probability increases.
39 The reported standard errors of the parameters are based on the asymptotic variance matrix dened in Appendix C.1. The parameters are estimated at λ = 50. The sensitivity analyses in Appendix D.5 show that the results in Tables 7 and 8 are robust to a wide range of values of λ. Table 9 shows the estimated average value of a policy to each lobbying coalition. In the model, the policy value distribution depends on whether or not the policy is directly relevant to the lobbying group. When a policy is directly relevant to the group, the average value of the policy is estimated to be much higher than when it is not directly relevant. For example, a typical policy that directly aects the coal lobbying coalition, such as a clean coal subsidy, is estimated to be worth $1.8 billion, while other energy policies that target other coalitions are estimated to be valued at $443 million by the coal coalition on average.
One way to validate my estimates is to compare the estimated value distribution to the actual value distribution. However, private valuations of specic policies to each lobbying coalition are mostly unavailable, and therefore are not included in the estimation. In particular, the economic impact of an environmental or market regulation on the targeted industry, as well as on non-targeted industries which may be indirectly aected, is very hard to measure. In my dataset, there are 27 policies in which the federal government directly spends money for private entities, and the authorized amount of money to be appropriated is listed.
Among these policies, 22 are grants, R&D subsidies, or loans or loan guarantees for bio and other renewable energy industries, and the rest are directed towards new nuclear power plants, coal-to-liquid projects, etc. The average government spending authorized by these policies is $736 million, and the standard deviation is $579 million. The average value of a policy which is directly relevant to the renewable energy lobbying coalition is estimated to be $770 million, as can be seen in Table 9 .
The Eect of Lobbying Expenditures on Policy Enactment
Based on the estimates, I nd that the eect of lobbying expenditures on the equilibrium policy enactment probability is very small. This assessment is based on the following exercise. First, I simulate the equilibrium enactment probability and the initial enactment probability for each policy, conditional on the observed participation prole and observable characteristics of the policy and lobbying coalitions. Second, I calculate the dierence between the two probabilities. If lobbying were not allowed, the initial enactment probability would be the nal enactment probability. Therefore, the absolute dierence in these two probabilities is due to lobbying expenditures by both supporting and opposing lobbying coalitions. This measure of the eect of lobbying expenditures on the enactment probability for policy k, conditional on participation prole d k and observable characteristics w k , can be mathematically expressed as: Table 10 , on average, neither enacted nor not-enacted policies were largely aected by lobbying expenditures. I nd that even the largest eect of lobbying in the data is estimated to be 0.4 percentage points. The nding that lobbying expenditures hardly aect policy-making results from the following two channels. First, the eects of lobbying expenditures by competing interests partially cancel each other out. Second, the estimated enactment production function is such that the marginal eect of lobbying expenditures on the policy enactment probability is very small. I discuss these two channels in detail.
Competing Interests
The average dierence between the equilibrium enactment probability and the initial enactment probability, conditional on the observed participation prole and observable characteristics of the policy and lobbying coalitions, is 0.05 percentage points for those policies on which at least one of the lobbying coalitions lobbied. Out of 538 policies in the dataset, 460 policies were lobbied by at least one of the lobbying coalitions. Table 11 shows the eect of lobbying expenditures on the equilibrium enactment probability conditional on the following cases: (i) when only the supporting lobbying coalitions lobbied; (ii) when only the opposing lobbying coalitions lobbied; and (iii) when both sides lobbied. The second and the third columns show the eects of lobbying by supporting and opposing groups respectively, and each eect is calculated by simulating the expectation of the dierence in the enactment probability due to the supporting (or opposing) lobbying expenditures, conditional on the observed participation prole and observable characteristics of the policy and lobbying coalitions.
Both supporting and opposing lobbying occurred for 167 policies in the dataset, and the lobbying eorts by both sides partially canceled each other out. To quantify this canceled-out eect, I use a measure as dened as the ratio of twice the minimum of these two eects by each side to the sum of these eects. For example, suppose that supporting groups increased the enactment probability of a policy by 2 percentage points and opposing groups decreased it by 8 percentage points, resulting in a 6-percentage-point decrease in the end. In this scenario, by adding the absolute value of each group's eects, we have a potential total change in the enactment probability of 10 percentage points, while 4 percentage points of the probability changes are wasted. Based on the aforementioned measure, 40 percent of the lobbying eects are canceled-out here. Using this measure, I nd that when both sides lobbied, about 20 40 These statistics are based on the simulation of the equilibrium enactment probability of 460 policies for which at least one of the lobbying coalitions in the data engaged in lobbying activities. 
Enactment Production Function
Based on the estimates of β and γ, I conclude that the eect of lobbying expenditures on the policy enactment probability is very small even without the canceling-out eect. To illustrate this point, I calculate the eect of additional lobbying expenditures ( s ,k ) by lobbying coalition on the probability that policy k is enacted, assuming is the only coalition which is interested in the policy. If the lobbying coalition favors the policy, the eect (or the change in the enactment probability) can be mathematically represented as:
, where π is the initial enactment probability and s − is the vector of lobbying expenditures by all other lobbying coalitions. Similarly, if opposes the policy, the eect can be represented as:
Note that this eect, regardless of the position of lobbying coalition , depends on s ,k and π. First, in both cases, the smaller s ,k is, the larger the change in the enactment probability is, given s ,k . Second, if lobbies the government for the policy, the change in the enactment probability is the largest when π = 0. On the other hand, if is in opposition to the policy, the change in the enactment probability is the largest when π = 1.
In Table 12 , the changes in the enactment probability are shown when the sole lobbying player either supports or opposes the policy, as a function of the change in lobbying spending by player ( s ,k ). As discussed earlier, the change in the enactment probability depends on s ,k and π, and I set s ,k and π such that the eect of the additional lobbying expenditures is the largest. The choices of s ,k are closely related to the data: $66,000 is the average per-policy lobbying expenditure by the renewable energy lobbying coalition, and $3 million is over ten times as much as the average per policy lobbying expenditures by the coal lobbying coalition. There are two notable trends in the results: First, the eect of lobbying expenditures is fairly small even when only one player lobbies and spends a large amount of money (such as $3 million); and second, the eect of lobbying expenditures is much larger when players lobby against a policy than when they lobby in favor of it. Table 12 Change in enactment probability as lobbying spending increases advocates. They nd that lobbying in general has a very small eect on policy-making.
They also nd a modest correlation between the resource advantage of a lobbying organization and its lobbying success when the organization is in favor of the status quo. They argue that there are various ways in which the opponents of a proposed policy are at an advantage. First, governmental and public attention are limited. As a result, the proponents of a policy change often struggle to drum up interest in a specic issue. Second, there are multiple veto points in the policy-making process, from committee actions to nal approval by the president. For the proponents of a proposed policy to be ultimately successful, they must be successful at all veto points. However, a policy's opponents need only be successful at any one of the various veto points to achieve their policy goals. Third, opponents often have a very compelling and easily-constructed lobbying argument: they can simply focus on the uncertainty following and unknown consequences of a possible change in policy.
The large asymmetry in the estimated eect of lobbying arises from particular features of the data and the policy enactment production function. Given the policy enactment production function specied in equation (3.1), for a supporter (opponent), the benet of lobbying participation decreases (increases), ceteris paribus, as the initial enactment probability increases:
Therefore, the lower the initial probability of enactment is, the more likely it is for a supporter to lobby and the less likely it is for an opponent to lobby. This feature is consistent with 41 See Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) for a summary.
the evidence presented by Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech (2009) . Based on their interviews, the authors nd that for the policy proposals that have little chance of success, supporters are active while opponents often nd little need to assert themselves or even to register their disagreement.
Given the policy enactment production function, the nal enactment probability for policies with supporting lobbying only would, on average, be much smaller than that for policies with opposing lobbying only if (i) the eect parameters for the supporting and opposing lobbying were the same, and (ii) the supporters and opponents have the same policy value distributions (in magnitudes). In the data, as can be seen in Table 4 , the dierence between the nal enactment probabilities when there was supporting lobbying only and when there was opposing lobbying only is not statistically signicant. Therefore, it must be the case that either condition (i) or (ii) This leaves us one possibility, which is that the eect parameters for supporting and opposing lobbying are not the same. In particular, opponents must be more eective than supporters to rationalize their lobbying participation even when the initial enactment probability is small. 42
Caveats
In interpreting the ndings here, one may consider the following issues. First, this study is focused on energy policies in legislation and energy industry lobbying during the 110th
Congress. Therefore, one should not generalize the ndings here to a dierent policy issue or a dierent Congress.
43 Second, the results in this paper do not imply that the policy-making outcomes would be more or less unchanged should lobbying be completely banned. The reason for this is that some part of the lobbying activities may be directed towards shaping the pool of policies to be discussed in the Congress. Because these are not documented in the lobbying reports in general, I take the list of policies as exogenously given. It is also possible that the mere presence of the interest groups in Washington, which are often well-equipped with other political instruments such as public advertising and grassroots mobilization, may deter certain policies from being on the agenda in the Congress. What the ndings in this paper can say is that once a policy is formally introduced to Congress in a piece of legislation, the eect of lobbying on its enactment is very small.
Average Returns to Lobbying
To calculate the average returns to lobbying, I rst consider the expected net benet to lobbying coalition from spending s ,k to lobby on policy k. The expected net benet depends on the lobbying expenditures of all coalitions (s k ), the initial enactment probability of the 42 When estimating a similar model with a dierent enactment production function, this asymmetry may disappear. This is related to how the benet of lobbying participation is related to the initial enactment probability. In Appendix D.2, I discuss the estimation results based on the alternative enactment production function, and explain why the asymmetric eects disappear.
43 However, the model t exercises in Appendix E indicate that the estimates of the model based on the 110th Congress can explain policy enactment and lobbying in the subsequent two Congresses reasonably well. policy (π k ), and the policy values to the coalitions (v k ). I denote the expected net benet by
wheres − ,k is the vector of the optimal lobbying expenditures by the other coalitions if coalition does not lobby, which can be solved as a function of (π k , v k ). 44 Here, an important component is the counter-factual enactment probability, Pr(Enact.
In the existing literature, this counter-factual enactment probability is ignored, which may lead to over-estimation of the average returns.
If we observed all arguments in b ,k (·), the average returns to lobbying would be simply dened as b ,k (s k , π k , v k )/s ,k . However, we observe none of the arguments in the expected net benet. Instead, we observe policy attributes (w k ) and lobbying participation prole (d k ).
Therefore, I construct the expectation of average returns to lobbying conditional on (w k , d k ):
where the expectation is taken over (π k , v k ) conditional on (w k , d k ). Based on the estimated parameters of the model, I calculate the above returns for each policy, and report the average values in Table 13 . Note that the structural approach in this paper allows me to calculate this object.
As can be seen in Table 13 , I nd that the returns to lobbying are similar among the lobbying coalitions, and that they range from about 137152 percent. Although the eect of lobbying on the enactment probability in equilibrium is estimated to be small, the average returns to lobbying are estimated to be large because the average value of a policy is very large. In the table, I also show the estimated average value of a policy to each lobbying coalition. For example, to the coal coalition, the average value of a policy is estimated to be $802 million, while the average lobbying expenditure by the coalition per policy upon lobbying participation is $291,588.
44 An alternative counter-factual enactment probability is Pr(Enact.|s = 0, s − ,k ). However, this is not consistent with the model where lobbying participation decisions are made before making lobbying expenditure decisions. 
Gains from Policy-Level Analysis
In understanding and quantifying how eective interest group lobbying is on legislation, a popular empirical approach has been to focus on a particular bill and study the causal relationship between politicians' votes on that bill and interest group pressure. For example, Caldeira and Wright (1998) 
45
One implicit assumption used in this literature is that the content of a bill is taken as exogenously given. However, it has been documented that lobbyists assist legislators in the writing of bills (Hall and Deardor (2006) ); and that they aect the participation behavior of members in committees where bills are discussed and amended before a oor vote (Hall and Wayman (1990) ).
To study the relationship between lobbying and bill content, I construct bill-level moments on enactment and lobbying participation computed over four exclusive subsets of the 445 bills in the data, as presented in Table 14 . The divisions are based on (i) whether a bill includes a single policy or multiple ones, and (ii) whether any of the policies contained in the bill appear in other bills or not. One notable feature in the table is that the enactment rate is much lower in the bill-level data (1.1 percent) than in the policy-level data (8.4 percent). This dierence is explained by the fact that 87 bills out of the 440 failed bills (19.8 percent) contain policies that were later enacted. Another feature seen in the table is that bills containing policies that appear in other bills are more likely to be enacted and are more heavily lobbied than those without such policies. characteristics related to the content of the bill are potentially correlated with the error term in the enactment equation because bill contents are endogenously determined. In sum, the bill-level estimation results may be biased due to the combination of omitted variables such as lobbying expenditures on other related bills and endogenous selection of the bill content.
To quantify the degree of such bias, I estimate the model using the bill-level data. In doing so, the specication of the model is slightly adjusted so that the initial enactment probability of a bill in equation (3.2) and the value of the bill to a lobbying coalition in equation (3.3) are allowed to depend on the characteristics of the policies contained in the bill.
46 To compare these estimation results with those using the policy-level data, I simulate the original model at the policy level and aggregate the results to the bill level to construct the moments in Table   15 .
47 As can be seen in the table, the eects of lobbying expenditures on the probability that a bill is enacted are estimated to be much larger in the bill-level analysis than those in the policy-level analysis, while the value of a typical bill in the data is estimated to be much lower.
Additionally, one could utilize the bill-level data to analyze the process by which policies are bundled into bills. Legislative bargaining and agenda setting have long been theoretically studied (see, for example, the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ), but empirical research in this area is scant. Unpacking the process by which lobbying eorts are converted into political outcomes in such a manner would allow one to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms at play. This topic is left for future research.
46 Specically, I allow that the initial enactment probability of a bill may depend on an indicator variable that takes 1 if the bill includes at least 15 energy policies and 0 otherwise, as well as the maximum values of the public opinion variables (salience and public opinion) and the dummy variables on the policy content (more regulation, less regulation, more government spending ) over all the policies contained in the bill. The value of a bill to a lobbying coalition is dened as the sum of the values of the policies contained in the bill, where the absolute value of each policy is log-normally distributed as in equation (3.3).
47 When aggregating the results to the bill-level, I use the composition of the bills in the data. The eect of lobbying expenditures on the enactment of a bill is dened as the average of such eects on the policies contained in that bill.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a unique approach to the empirical analysis of political inuence by interest groups based on the specication and estimation of an all-pay contest with heterogeneous interest groups over policies considered in the U.S. Congress. One of the main contributions of this paper is that I debut a novel unit of analysis: policies, which are parts of bills, rather than bills themselves as in previous works. This is particularly relevant for the study of lobbying behaviors because the content of a bill can and often does change throughout the entirety of the legislative process. I show that bill-level analyses which take the content of a bill as exogenously given can generate biased estimates of the eects of lobbying expenditures on policy changes.
Using a newly-constructed dataset that contains information on policies and lobbying activities, I have quantied the eect of lobbying expenditures on the probability that a policy is enacted, and estimated the average returns to lobbying expenditures for or against a policy. I nd that the eect of lobbying expenditures on a policy's equilibrium enactment probability is very small. Nonetheless, the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130 percent. In this study, I focus on energy policies and lobbying activities targeting these policies by energy rms. Given that lobbying expenditures by the energy sector comprise 12 percent of all lobbying expenditures, these ndings are interesting in their own right, though it remains to be seen whether the results for lobbying in the energy sector will extend to lobbying in other domains. The approach developed in this paper can however be applied to study the eects of lobbying in other policy domains.
The ndings are closely related to the puzzle that the total amount of lobbying expenditures is relatively small when compared to the value of the government policies they are intended to inuence. A similar observation regarding campaign contributions was made by Tullock (1972) and Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) . If lobbying is a part of the economic activities of interest groups, one potential explanation for the puzzle is that the average returns to lobbying are small. However, I nd that the average returns are much larger than normal market returns. Furthermore, papers that look at lobbying expenditures and stock returns, such as Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Ness (2013) , nd that shareholders value lobbying activities. This implies that lobbyists could charge the interest groups much more, but they do not.
This suggests that signicant frictions may exist in the market for policy inuence. One such friction is limited access to the market. Granted, in this paper, I impose very minimal market frictions on the four energy lobbying coalitions. The only friction in the model is that the coalitions are supposed to incur the minimum initial lobbying costs. However, this almost unrestricted access to the market may be available only to certain rms and trade associations. Another friction in the market is related to political organization as described by Olson (1965) . A further study on these potential frictions in the market can be very important to our understanding of the policy-making process and the welfare implications of the regulation of lobbying.
A. Data Construction
A.1. Sample Selection Rule
The dataset covers all bill sections that create, modify, or repeal a federal nancial intervention or regulation whose main statutory subject is coal, oil, nuclear or renewable energy companies, or electric and gas utilities. The challenge is to eectively winnow out all relevant bill sections from the pool of over 11,000 bills and joint resolutions that were introduced during the 110th
Congress. By employing the following procedure, I select 2,279 bill sections that are contained in 445 bills and joint resolutions.
First, I divide all versions of bills and joint resolutions into sections as dened in the text.
48 Then, I select 9,613 bill sections based on the words in the title of the bill section.
With a program I coded for this specic purpose, I check each section to determine if its title includes at least one word related to the energy industry. The number of the words I include in my search is over 500; all words are related to various energy sources (coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and renewable energy), electricity, and environmental regulations. Lastly, I read each section in order to exclude the sections whose main statuary subjects are not coal, oil, nuclear, or renewable energy companies, or electric and gas utilities. For example, a bill section regarding energy-ecient government buildings may include the term energy-ecient, but it is not directly related to the energy industry that I study in this paper.
A.2. Bill Sections vs. Policies
Here, I describe the procedures to determine the unit of analysisa policyand its nal legislative status, namely, whether or not it was enacted. First, based on a vector space model, I represent the sections by corresponding vectors based on word frequency, and measure the distance between the vectors by calculating the cosine of the angle between them. When the cosine measure is 0, the sections have no similarity because it means that there are no words that exist in both sections. On the other hand, when the measure is 1, the sections are equal because it means that all words used in one section are also used in the other section with the same frequency. Although the ordering of the words may be dierent, this is of less concern because bills are written in a formulaic manner.
Second, I group the bill sections based on the measured distances. I consider two texts whose distance is greater than or equal to 0.985 as the same, or connected, as dened in the graph theory. With this cuto, it is reasonable to consider that the two connected texts are essentially the same. Third, using a Matlab routine to nd connected components in graph (graphconncomp.m), I group the 2,279 bill sections into 962 components. On average and based on the metric, 2.4 bill sections are considered to be the same. For example, creating a production tax credit for electricity produced from marine renewable resources appeared in 32 dierent bill sections in the exact same terms. The distribution of the number of bill sections that are categorized as one component is shown in Figure 6 .1.
48 The text of each version of a bill or a joint resolution is available on the website of the Government Printing Oce. Note that a bill or a joint resolution may have multiple versions as it goes through the legislative process. Table 16 Movement of policies across bills Lastly, I combine some components if (i) they address the same policy issue and (ii) they aect each of the lobbying coalitions in the same direction, either positively or negatively.
Two dierent policy proposals or bill sections are considered to address the same policy issue if they either amend the same section(s) of the United States Code, or create a new section with the same or a very similar title. After this procedure, the 962 components are re-grouped into 538 groups, with each group representing a policy in the analysis. On average, each policy appeared in about 3 dierent bills. The distribution of the number of bill sections that are categorized as one policy is shown in Figure 6 .1. Table 16 shows the average and the standard deviation of the number of bills across which a policy moved during the two-year term of the Congress, conditional on the legislative status of the rst bill and the last bill. The legislative status of the last bill determines the nal status of the policy. Most policies (494 policies) began with a bill when it was introduced to the Congress, while the remainder were inserted into bills after they were initially introduced. Typically, a new section can be added to an original bill as the bill goes through the committee(s) and the oor of House and Senate.
Most policies (388 policies) did not pass or were not reported by the committee(s), although they were often reintroduced as a part of another bill. It can also be seen that those policies which were nally enacted were included in about 6 bills on average. 49 In identifying rms or associations in the energy sector, one of the main challenges is that there is no standard identier for companies or organizations.
To overcome this challenge, I merge my dataset with the dataset compiled and cleaned by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) to determine the industry in which a lobbying client is involved and to gure out parent-subsidiary relationships and the changes in the names of companies, due for example to mergers and acquisitions. I also did my own research on rms and trade associations by checking their websites and the website of Bloomberg Businessweek (investing.businessweek.com) when the information in the CRP dataset was not sucient.
In the analysis, I designate certain rms and trade associations as strategic or major in lobbying the legislature on energy policies, and assume that they lobby cooperatively as lobbying coalitions. The members of lobbying coalitions are listed in Table 17 .
49 I exclude the following rms and associations which can be considered as in the energy sector: (i) community-owned electric utilities, rural electric cooperatives, and public power districts (93 entities); (ii) foreign energy companies (9 entities); (iii) independent power providers (26 entities); and (iv) rms that are only involved electric transmission (10 entities). This analysis is complementary to the policy tracking because I record whether or not a bill contains a similar policy issue discussed in the 110th Congress by actually reading the text, not by calculating the numerical distance between texts. Because this analysis requires careful reading of bill texts, not all bills were studied; only those that satisfy the aforementioned conditions were read and compared to the policies discussed during the 110th
Congress.
As can be seen in Table 18 , 65 percent of the energy bills that were enacted or passed by either House during the four-year period contain only the issues that were never discussed during the 110th Congress. Examples of these bills are S. 3473 on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which was enacted during the 111th Congress, and H.R. 1938 on the Keystone XL pipeline project, which was passed by the House but not by the Senate during the 112th
B. Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-strategy Equilibrium in the 2nd Stage
Proof. The proof is constructive and is similar to the arguments in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) . Suppose the set of the participants are given in the rst stage:
Suppose player i lobbies for a policy. The player solves the following maximization problem given {π, T −i,f , T a }:
If t * i maximizes player i's expected payo , t * i must satisfy the rst order condition:
where T * f and T * a are equilibrium outcomes. Using the denition that T * f ≡ j∈L f t * j and (6.1), we can derive the following equation:
Similarly, using the rst order condition of opposing players, we can derive the following equation:
Note that the payo functions are concave, so the rst order conditions are sucient and necessary for optimality. Now, let S * denote T * f + T * a . Then equations (6.2) and (6.3) can be rewritten as: 6.6) Note that the proof is done if Ψ(S) = 0 has a unique solution. By dierentiating equations (6.4) and (6.5) with respect to S, we obtain
Note that ψ f (S) ≥ 0 and ψ f (S) ≥ 0 as long as S ≥ S 0 ≡ max{S 0f , S 0a }. Note also that ψ f (S) ≥ 1 if and only if 
The second equality results from the denition of S a , and the third equality results from the fact that S f ≤ S a . Third, for any S ≥ S 0 , Ψ(S) is strictly increasing because ψ f (S) ≥ 1 and
and the argument is similar. In the last case, (Case III), S * ≥ S 0 because Ψ(S 0 ) ≤ 0, and Ψ(S) is strictly increasing in S ≥ S 0 as ψ f (S) ≥ 1 and ψ a (S) ≥ 1.
C. Estimator
C.1. Asymptotic Variance of the Estimator
One can show that under regularity conditions as described in Theorem 4.1.3 in Amemiya (1985) ,
C.2. Comparison with an Ecient GMM Estimator
Alternatively, one can use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, as suggested by Imbens and Lancaster (1994) , based on the moment conditions that (i) the expectation of the rst derivative of log-likelihood, or the score, is zero; and (ii) the expectation of the dierence between the observed total lobbying expenditures and the model-predicted total lobbying expenditures by each player is zero. The weighting matrix of the GMM estimator can be likened to the weight of the estimator used in this paper, λ. While there exists a theoretical guidance for an optimal weighting matrix for the GMM estimator so that the eciency of the estimator is guaranteed, I do not have a counterpart for the estimator used in this paper. Let us denote the ecient GMM estimator asθ n . It can be seen that the dierence between the asymptotic covariance matrix of √ n(θ n − θ 0 ), denoted asΣ n , and the asymptotic covariance matrix of √ n(θ n (λ) − θ 0 ), denoted asΣ n (λ), is positive-denite for any choice of λ > 0. Therefore, the issue is whether a researcher can nd a weight λ such thatΣ n (λ) is close enough toΣ n that the information in the data is fully used for making statistical inferences. As can be seen in the section on empirical results, the key parameters of the model are estimated with a high degree of precision. Furthermore, compared to this GMM estimator, the estimator used in this paper is computationally less intensive.
C.3. Computation of ϕ (·)
The scalar objective function Q n (θ) includesφ (w k ; θ), which denotes the expected lobbying expenditures by interest group for policy k with attributes w k for any = 1, ..., L:
where d * k (v k , π k ) denotes the equilibrium lobbying participation prole given (v k , π k ). In the above equation, ϕ (·) denotes the optimal amount of the lobbying expenditures of group
given policy values to all groups (v k ) and initial enactment probability (π k ).
To obtain ϕ (·) for any given (v k , π k ), I rst consider all possible lobbying participation proles. If there are L interest groups, the total number of the proles is 2 L . For each lobbying participation prole, I solve for the equilibrium lobbying spending prole. When solving the equilibrium, I use an algorithm derived from the proof for the existence and uniqueness of the second-stage equilibrium in Appendix B. There is no closed-form solution, but the proof is instrumental to compute the equilibrium. For each lobbying participation prole, I calculate the sum of the equilibrium payos of all interest groups. Then I nd the participation prole with the largest sum of the payos. This is denoted as
D. Robustness of the Results
In sections D.1D.4, I present sensitivity analyses regarding each assumption for identication, discussed in Section 4. In section D.5, the empirical role of the weight (λ) in the penalized likelihood estimator used in this paper is discussed. Lastly, two sets of sensitivity analyses regarding the assumptions that I impose when constructing the data are presented in sections D.6 and D.7.
D.1. Denition of a Policy (Assumption 1)
The key part of Assumption 1 is that the lobbying activities regarding one policy are assumed not to aect the enactment of another policy. To evaluate how sensitive the results are to this assumption, I group some policies as related in the sense that the lobbying activities regarding one policy may aect the enactment of other policies in the group. To eect this grouping, I rely on (i) the broad issue and (ii) the positions of each energy lobbying coalition.
There are 58 unique broad issues, ranging from air pollution regulation of stationary sources to oil spill management. Based on this grouping exercise, I identify 146 policy groups. I assume that each lobbying coalition decides its lobbying decisions on a policy group as a whole. Furthermore, if any of the policies within a group is enacted, the policy group itself is recorded to be enacted. As a result, the enactment probability (21.2 percent) for the policy group is much larger than that of individual policies (8.4 percent).
Using these 146 policy groups, instead of 538 policies in the main estimation, I estimate the model, and present the results in the third column in Table 19 . As can be seen in the table, the estimated eectiveness of lobbying is is proportionately much larger but still relatively small in magnitude. Moreover, the eect of and the returns to lobbying are estimated to be within the 95 percent condence interval of the respective estimates of the main estimation.
D.2. Parametric Assumptions (Assumptions 2)
I make specic parametric assumptions on the enactment production function. To understand how sensitive the results are to these assumptions, I estimate the model with a dierent specication of the enactment production function. The following specication of a policy enactment production function is based on the idea that the dierence in lobbying eorts by both sides determines the probability that a policy is enacted, so that policy k is enacted if
where the random variable k follows a cumulative density function F . 50 This randomness in the outcome of lobbying represents unexpected changes in the environment, such as economic and electoral conditions, that could aect the legislator's votes. Z k δ + ξ k summarizes the initial level of support for policy k in the legislature, and thus F (Z k δ + ξ k ) is the probability that the policy is enacted in the absence of lobbying.
The distribution of k determines how the marginal benet of one's lobbying spending depends on the initial enactment probability. If the probability density function f is singlepeaked, then the marginal benet of lobbying is also single-peaked. In the specication considered in the main text, the marginal benet of lobbying is monotone in the initial enactment probability. Here, I assume that k follows a triangular distribution with the nite support of (λ L , λ U ) with a unique mode of λ 0 ∈ (λ L , λ U ). 51
In Table 19 , the estimation results based on this alternative specication are shown in the fourth column, headed as Alternative (2). As can be seen in the table, the results are very similar to those under the base specication except that the dierence between the lobbying eect parameters from each side, (β f , β a ), is not statistically signicant. Unlike the specication considered in the main text, the relationship between the benet of lobbying participation and the initial enactment probability is the same for both supporters and opponents. As a result, given this alternative specication, the initial enactment probability when there was only supporting lobbying is predicted to be similar to that when there was only opposing lobbying, if the eect parameters are symmetric.
D.3. Equilibrium Selection Rule (Assumption 3)
In the main estimation, I assume a specic equilibrium selection rule, where the equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the payos of all players is chosen if there exist multiple equilibria.
In Table 19 , I show the estimation results based on a dierent equilibrium selection rule, where the equilibrium that minimizes the sum of the payos is chosen. As can be seen in the table, the results are very similar to those in the main estimation.
D.4. Entry Cost Parameter (Assumption 4)
I assume that the entry cost is observed by the econometrician. In the estimation, I plug in the smallest lobbying expenditures undertaken by entities that lobbied the Congress regarding 50 This specication was considered and estimated in earlier versions of this paper.
51 Both scale and location normalizations are necessary. When estimating the model, I normalize λ0 to be 0 and |λU − λL| to be 2. In addition, I assume that k is distributed symmetrically around λ0. As a result, I estimate the parameters of the model under the assumption that (λL, λ0, λU ) is (−1, 0, 1).
one policy, which is $5,000. This estimate of the entry cost may not be a consistent estimate for two reasons. First, the data is potentially truncated because an entity with small lobbying expenditures or revenues is not required to register and report to the government if certain conditions are met. However, this problem is mitigated by the fact that once registered, an entity is supposed to report its lobbying activities regardless of the amount of its total lobbying costs or revenues. Second, the lobbying entry cost for a player in the analysis may be dierent from that of an entity. For these reasons, I show how the results may change as I change the value of the entry cost. I perform two analyses, where the entry cost is $100 and $50,000 respectively. Note that the average per-policy lobbying expenditure by the renewable energy lobbying coalition is $66,000, which is close to $50,000.
In Table 19 , I show the estimation results of the two analyses in the last two columns, headed as Alternative (4) and Alternative (5). First, the estimates of the parameters of the enactment production function are larger as the entry cost is set to have larger values. This is an expected result because to maintain the same participation rate given higher entry costs, the marginal benet of lobbying should be larger. Second, the average eect of lobbying expenditures on the enactment probability of a policy is very small in all cases, while on average, higher entry costs lead to higher eects. Lastly, the returns of lobbying expenditures to all lobbying coalitions are around 100 percent or more, while a higher entry cost is related to lower returns.
D.5. Weight in the Objective Function of the Estimator
As discussed earlier, the estimatorθ n maximizes the following objective function, Q n (θ):
θ n is consistent for any choice of λ > 0. With a nite sample, the choice of λ does aect the results. As the value of λ decreases, the average log-likelihood plays a more important role in pinning down the estimated parameters. The estimation results shown in the main text are based on λ = 50. In the main estimation, the rst part of the objective function, the average log-likelihood, is estimated to be -2.79573 and the second part of the objective function is -0.00015. Given these values, I choose two alternative values for λ, 0.005 and 5,000, to see how sensitive the results are. The estimation results can be found in Table 20 . Note that the key ndings under λ being 0.005 or 5,000 are within the 95 percent condence regions of those under λ being 50. In Table 21 , I document how the choice of λ aects the estimated values of log-likelihood and total expenditures. At λ = 0.05, the absolute value of the average log-likelihood is the smallest among the three cases, but the predicted total lobbying expenditures are the furthest away from the observed total lobbying expenditures.
D.6. Total Lobbying Expenditures on Energy Policies
To estimate the model, the sum of lobbying expenditures by each player on all energy policies is needed. However, in the data, I observe the sum of lobbying expenditures on all policies for each player. To determine the fraction of lobbying expenditures spent on energy policies, I Note: The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors, and those in brackets are 95 percent condence intervals. In Alternative (6) and Alternative (7), I use dierent values for the weight (λ) in the objective function of the estimator, 0.05 and 5,000, respectively. In the base estimation, the weight is set at 50see section D.5 for further explanation. In Alternative (8), the energy lobbying expenditures are assumed to be 20 percent of the total lobbying expenditures. In Alternative (9), the results of a similar exercise, except that the ratio is 100 percent, are shown. See section D.6 for more detailed discussions on these two exercises. In Alternative (10), I use a dierent rule for determining the policy positions for each lobbying coalition, which I explain in detail in subsection D.7. Table 21 Role of weight (λ) in the estimation λ = 50 λ = 0.05 λ =5,000 use information on lobbying participation at the bill level. First, for each entity that belongs to a player, I multiply its total lobbying expenditures by the ratio of the number of energy bills that the entity lobbied to the total number of bills that it lobbied. Then, I sum the obtained energy lobbying expenditures over all entities that belong to the player. For each lobbying coalition or player, Table 22 shows both the total lobbying expenditures and the calculated total energy lobbying expenditures. Based on the records on bill lobbying, the renewable energy coalition is more focused on lobbying regarding energy issues (73 percent)
than other coalitions such as oil and gas (46 percent) or nuclear energy (48 percent). This is consistent with the size of rms and organizations in each coalition: The bigger the rm or the organization is, the more likely that it is involved in lobbying a variety of issues such as general taxation and labor issues. As shown in Table 2 , the average assets held by a member of the oil and gas coalition at the end of 2007 are $159.57 billion, which is much larger than the total assets held by the whole renewable energy coalition ($41.04 billion).
Although the bill-level lobbying information is the best available information for inferring energy-specic lobbying expenditures, it does not provide the exact amount of money spent on energy lobbying. To see how the way I determine the energy lobbying expenditures aects the results, I conduct two sensitivity analyses where the energy lobbying expenditures are respectively assumed to be 20 percent and 100 percent of the total lobbying expenditures. In Table 20 , the estimation results based on both methods are shown, and they are very similar.
D.7. Policy Position
The position of a lobbying coalition on a specic policy is not always observed in the data, so I construct the position variable based on a variety of auxiliary sources of information. As discussed earlier, this variable may contain a misclassication error. To address this issue, I construct an alternative position variable such that the estimated eect of lobbying can be maximal, and then re-estimate the model using this variable instead of the originally constructed position variable.
It can be seen that the eect of lobbying would be estimated to be the largest if all participating players' lobbying was successful.
52 Given this argument, I construct an alternative position variable such that if a player lobbied on an enacted (rejected) policy, its position 52 This is especially the case given the enactment production function used in the analysis. The change in the enactment probability due to supporting (opposing) lobbying is decreasing (increasing) in the initial enactment probability. Therefore, if there is supporting (opposing) lobbying only, the initial enactment probability is likely to be low (high), which will lead to a higher estimated eect of lobbying if the lobbied policy passes (fails). is recorded as supporting (opposing). Table 23 shows the frequency of taking a supportive position regarding a policy for each player, under both methods of constructing the position variable. Since most of the policies in the dataset failed to be enacted, the frequency is lower under the alternative method.
In Table 20 , the estimation results based on both policy position variables are shown. It can be seen that the lobbying eect parameter for opponents, β a , is estimated to be higher under the alternative policy positions. Furthermore, the aggregate eect of lobbying is estimated to be 0.15 percentage points, which is much higher than the original estimate of 0.04 percentage points. However, the dierence between the estimates under both scenarios is not statistically signicant. In addition, the extent of the estimates of the lobbying eects is relatively small even if I estimate the model with data where the policy positions are recorded such that the lobbying eects would be estimated to be the largest.
E. Can We Generalize the Results to Other Congresses?
To understand the extent to which we can generalize the estimation results to other Congresses, I simulate the model using the estimated parameters in Table 7 and the data on the policies that were considered during the 110th Congress and then re-considered during either of the subsequent two Congresses. There are 159 policies that appeared during both the 110th and the 111th Congresses, and 66 policies that were considered during both the 110th and the 112th. While the observable characteristics of these policies are invariant between Congresses, data on public opinion does change from year to year and is incorporated here. For some policies, polling data changes dramatically over the period of the study. For example, there are no polling questions on oil spill regulation during the 110th Congress in my data,
while there are many questions on that policy issue during the 111th. Table 24 represents the simulated moments as well as the corresponding observed moments.
Overall, the model ts the data well. For example, the model predicts the level of lobbying participation by the coal and the oil and gas coalitions reasonably well. Although the rates of lobbying participation by the nuclear and the renewable energy coalitions are over-predicted, the lobbying participation patterns broken down by policy positions match well both in terms of the level and the trend.
